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RA THWELL v. RA THWELL:
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY,
RESULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
by JOHN D. MCCAMUS* AND LARRY TAMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973, the Supreme Court of Canada was called on in Murdoch v.
Murdoch' to make a clear pronouncement on a wife's right to matrimonial
property on the dissolution of marriage. On that occasion, it may fairly be
said, the Court did not give unequivocal guidance with respect to this difficult
question. Five years later, a similar problem appeared in Rathwell v. Rathwell.
2
In this comment, we examine the judgment in the latter case with particular
emphasis on the important contribution made by Mr. Justice Dickson to the
clarification of some of the analytical problems which have plagued this area
of law.
II. THE FACTS
Lloyd and Helen Rathwell were farmers. From soon after their marriage
in 1944 until their separation in 1967, ".... [they] worked hard; they saved
their money and they bought land."3 They started out their life together with
savings of about $700; these sums they deposited in a joint bank account.
It was the only account they ever had. All monies received and all sums paid
passed through this single account for the whole of their married lives.
By the time of the separation in 1967, the Rathwells held land valued
at $105,000 and other assets worth $50,000. 4 In every case, title had been
taken in Mr. Rathwell's name.5 In every case, purchase monies came from
0 Copyright, 1978, John D. McCamus and Larry Taman.
" Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
** Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University.
1 [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423, 41 D.L.R.(3d) 367, [1974] 1 W.W.R. 361. For comments on
Murdoch, see E. Caparros, Le travail de la femme dun "rancher": une dicision renver-
sante de la Cour suprme (1974), 15 C. de D. 189; and R. Doering, Murdoch v.
Murdoch and the Law of Constructive Trusts (1974), 6 Ottawa L. Rev. 581; and
P. Jacobson, Murdoch v. Murdoch: Just About What the Ordinary Rancher's Wife Does
(1974), 20 McGiU L.J. 308.
2 (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 289, [1978] 2 W.W.R. 101 (S.C.C.), aff'g [1976] 5
W.W.R. 148, 23 R.F.L. 163 (Sask. C.A.), rev'g 14 R.F.L. 297 per Disberry J. For a
comment on the lower court judgments, see K. Cooper, Matrimonial Property Law in
Saskatchewan-The Embarrassment of Rathwell (1976), 40 Sask. L. Rev. 185.
3 Supra note 2, at 299 (D.L.R.), 105 (W.W.R.) per Dickson J.
4 Supra note 2, at 156 (W.W.R.) (Sask. C.A.).
The purchases were as follows:
a) 1946-two quarter sections purchased under the Veterans' Land Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. V-4; downpayment of $780 from the joint account; balance of $4,020
paid by delivery each year of one-sixth of the grain harvested;
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the joint bank account. In every case, some part of the purchase price was
in the form of a share of the crop harvested from the land or work performed
by Mr. Rathwell for the vendor. Mr. Rathwell clearly worked very hard to
acquire the land.
Mrs. Rathwell worked hard too:
According to Mr. Rathwell, they were "working together as a husband and wife
in the farming business." The venture was a "joint effort" in which, Mr. Rathwell
said, he and his wife "worked as a team, to start with." Mr. Rathwell acknowl-
edged that his wife contributed "to an extent." It was to a considerable extent.
Mrs. Rathwell did the chores when her husband was busy on the land; she looked
after the garden and canned the produce; she milked cows and sold the cream;
she drove machinery, bailed hay, provided meals and transportation for hired help
and kept the books and records of the farming operation. Often, while Mr.
Rathwell worked the fields, she fulfilled his obligations under a contract to drive
the school bus. She raised and educated four children. Woods J.A., of the Sas-
katchewan Court of Appeal made the observation, which I think correct, that to
grain-belt farmers the kitchen was just as much an integral part of the farming
operation as the feed lot or the machine shed.6
The Rathwells separated in 1967.
III. THE LITIGATION
In 1971, four years after the separation, the husband indicated an inten-
tion to dispose of the lands. The wife caused homestead caveats to be filed
against three of the ten quarter sections involved in the purchases of 1946,
1947 and 1958.7 In each case, she claimed under an alleged trust for a one-
tenth interest, alleging that she had advanced to the appellant ten percent
of the purchase price of the land. The action under appeal was apparently
commenced subsequent to the filing of the caveats. The wife sought a declara-
tion that she held a one-half interest in all real and personal property owned
by her husband and for an accounting. Disberry J. dismissed the action at
trial, holding essentially that there was no common intention that the prop-
erty was to be shared.8 The Court of Appeal of Saskatchewan reviewed the
b) 1947-two adjoining sections purchased under the Veterans' Land Act; down-
payment of $1,000 from the joint account, balance of $6,000, again paid by
crop share payments;
c) 1958-two further parcels; downpayment of $4,000 from the joint account;
balance satisfied through farm work, such as combining, seeding and summer
fallowing, done by Mr. Rathwell for the vendor of the land.
Note that in 1971 Mr. Rathwell acquired further land from his mother largely by
way of gift. Although Mrs. Rathwell claimed an interest in one-half of all her husband's
real property, only the three parcels listed above were seriously contended for.
6 Supra note 2, at 299 (D.L.R.), 105 (W.W.R.) per Dickson J.
7 She claimed against one quarter section in each of the three purchases, or approxi-
mately one-third of the holdings.
8 The claims of the wife may have appeared ambitious to Mr. Justice Disberry.
Certainly, the claim of a one-half interest in the land largely gifted to the husband by
his mother subsequent to the separation and the dissolution of the joint account was
unlikely to strike a responsive chord in His Lordship. The relief claimed in the divorce
action heard at the same time of a lump sum settlement of $150,000 in satisfaction of
all support obligations was probably never intended to succeed in toto were the declara-
tion of a trust in the land to be granted. The trial judge found that the wife, in giving
her evidence, was "playing to win;" ". . . that her evidence was too much influenced
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evidence and reversed the trial judge. Two of the three judges9 held (although
for differing reasons) that Mrs. Rathwell should have her declaration of
one-half interest in the lands (excepting the later acquisition by Mr. Rathwell
from his mother); the third judge'0 found for the wife with respect to the first
two acquisitions of 1946 and 1947. This last result was adopted by those
judges who dissented in part in the Supreme Court of Canada."
The Supreme Court of Canada divided 5-4 on the case. The plurality
judgment of Mr. Justice Dickson1 2 upholds the result below, relying on find-
ing on the facts both a resulting trust and a constructive trust in favour of
Mrs. Rathwell. A concurring judgment by Mr. Justice Ritchie 3 reached the
same result without expressing any opinion on the constructive trust issue,
relying upon an initial financial contribution as proof of common intention
that the property be shared. The dissent, as indicated, would have granted a
declaration of a one-half interest in the first two acquisitions.
IV. RESULTING TRUSTS
14
At common law, a married woman laboured under an incapacity to deal
with her own property. The courts of equity, on the other hand, followed a
policy of strict separation of property, which permitted a married woman to
by what she conceived would best advance her case . . ." The husband, on the other
hand, ". . . gave an impression of almost indifference to the outcome . . . ." Thus, the
trial judge indicated that he would place more reliance on the evidence of the husband
where there was conflicting evidence. Supra note 2, at 307 (R.F.L.).
One ground of appeal that failed in the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal was that
the trial judge had intervened unduly during the course of the trial, disclosing a bias
against the wife's case. His Lordship had been frank about his concerns, as the following
excerpt, supra note 2, at 159 (W.W.R.), 173 (R.F.L.) from the trial transcript
indicates:
Now I know that there's a very substantial amount being asked for by her, and
if she's got that she's not going to get it both ways. I mean the husband isn't
going to want to give up a lot of property and be worth that much less, and then
she collects off the husband on the basis that he's still got all his property. I'm
not going to do that. Somebody has to defend the men from the present mode
of the women's liberation movement. (Emphasis added.)
Subsequently, His Lordship was required to pass upon the evidence indicating that
the husband had frequently referred to the land as 'ours' which the wife testified she
took to mean 'his, mine and the children's.' He took the evidence this way, supra note 2,
at 304 (R.F.L.):
The fact is now so notorious that I am able to take judicial notice that husbands
(other than a foolhardy and valiant few) who desire a life of peaceful co-
existence within the matrimonial bailiwick rather than either a hot or cold war,
habitually use the diplomatic and ambiguous "ours" rather than the forthright and
challenging "mine" when referring to anything of monetary value.
9 Woods and Hall JJ.A.
'o Brownridge J.A.
11 Martland, Judson, Beetz and de Grandpr6 JJ.
12 In which Laskin CJ.C. and Spence J. concurred.
1s Pigeon J. concurring.
14 The general parts of the ensuing discussion draw heavily on the work of Pro-
fessor Maurice Cullity, who has clearly explicated the history, formulation and applica-
tion of the law of trusts to property acquired by spouses during marriage. See M. Cullity,
"Property Rights During the Subsistence of Marriage," in D. Mendes da Costa, ed.,
Studies in Canadian Family Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972) at 179.
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control her own property in those cases ruled by equity. The Chancellor pre-
vailed, as always, and the equitable approach was enshrined in the married
women's property legislation of England and the various Canadian provinces.
This barrier erected between the separate property of the spouses may
rarely prove dysfunctional during the life of the marriage. The healthy marital
relationship normally carries with it the full use and enjoyment of the matri-
monial home and associated property. As well, a happily married couple
normally reach acceptable accommodations as to the use and disposition of
property held by either of them during the marriage. The legal position of
strict separation is readily modified on consent to suit the needs of each
marriage.
Unfortunately, the same rigid separation may operate unfairly when
applied to the difficult problem of dividing property on the dissolution of a
marriage. It is a principle of easy application: each party takes all that prop-
erty to which he or she held legal title at separation or dissolution. 15 In this
separation of property regime, a spouse can gain a share of the beneficial
interest in property to which he or she is not legally entitled on exactly the
same basis on which any other stranger to the legal title might claim-that
some or all of the beneficial interest is held on a trust for him or her. This
claim might be for an express trust, firmly grounded on proof of an agreement
that the property be held in a trust. Where it is real property which is sought
to be impressed with the trust, a Statute of Frauds problem will arise. The
case of the express trust, it may be noted, is the only case in which one can
speak with certainty of the common intention of the parties as the juristic
basis for the obligation to hold beneficially.
Where a person purchases property or contributes funds for the pur-
chase of property to which legal title is taken in the name of another or
transferred to another, equity presumes a resulting trust in favour of the pur-
chaser. This is the prototype of the resulting trust. The same principle ought
to apply in the case of a purchase effected in money's worth. Where, for
example, A acquires property in return for his labour and transfers the title
to B, B would be presumed to hold on trust for A.
5  There have been judicial efforts to temper the complete unsuitability of subjecting
partners in marriage to rules designed for dealings between strangers. A very respectable
line of English authority interpreted the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 &
46 Vict., c. 75, to permit the courts a wide discretion in reallocating the title to property
to whichever spouse seemed just, irrespective of who held legal title. The leading case
in support of this wide interpretation is Rimmer v. Rimmer, [1953] 1 Q.B. 63, [1952]
2 All E.R. 863 (C.A.); applied in Cobb v. Cobb, [1955] 1 W.L.R. 731, [1955] 2 All
E.R. 696 (C.A.); and Fribance v. Fribance (No. 2), [1957] 1 W.L.R. 384, [1957] 1 All
E.R. 357 (C.A.); but distinguished in Silver v. Silver, [1958] 1 W.L.R. 259, [1958] 1 All
E.R. 523 (C.A.); and Richards v. Richards, [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1116, [1958] 3 All E.R.
513 (C.A.). These cases were subjected to the deprecatory epithet of "palm tree" justice
and, ultimately, the House of Lords rejected them in Pettitt v. Pettitt, [1970] A.C. 777,
[1969] 2 All E.R. 385, holding that nothing in the Married Women's Property Act con-
ferred on the courts a jurisdiction to override vested property rights. In Thompson v.
Thompson, [1961] S.C.R. 3, 26 D.L.R.(2d) 1, the Supreme Court of Canada, in obiter,
anticipated by some ten years the repudiation in the House of Lords of the "palm tree"
authorities. The majority of the Court in Murdoch, again in obiter, reiterated the
Thompson position in this regard.
744 [VOL. 16, NO. 3
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In either case, the presumption is rebuttable by evidence of a contrary
intention in the transferor. Note that no proof of common intention need be
made by the transferor. Rather, the resulting trust is premised on an inference
from the surrounding circumstances "that the transferee of land was not
intended to take the use or beneficial interest."16 As Scott indicates, 17 the
mediaeval lawyer did not trouble himself with whether the presumption of
resulting trust was a factual inference concerning the intention of the trans-
feror or a rule of law to prevent unjust enrichment. The doctrine arose from
the mediaeval preference for uses, some of which were undeclared, and was
applied in every case where there was no proof of an intention that the trans-
feree should have the beneficial interest. The burden of proving this intention
rested then and still rests on the transferee.
In Rathwell, these principles gave rise to a fairly straightforward route
to the presumption of resulting trust. Mr. Justice Dickson holds that
The law presumes [in certain cases] that the holder of the legal title was not in-
tended to take beneficially. There are certain situations--such as purchase in the
name of another-where the law unfailingly raises the presumption of resulting
trust... 18
He relies'9 on Halsbury's for the simple elaboration of the above rule:
1372. Property purchased wholly or partly with wife's money. Where property
is bought with money belonging to a wife and conveyed to her husband, there is
a resulting trust in favour of the wife in the absence of proof by the husband of
a contrary intention on her part .... 20
In this case, it might have been a simple matter to hold that the first
purchase was made from joint funds and that each subsequent purchase made
from the fruits of the prior sale was impressed with the original trust. This
seems to be at the root of the judgment of Ritchie J. It ought, however, to
be emphasized that in a case in which a wife makes a financial contribution
to the purchase price, the presumption is engaged without any need to prove
intention, common or otherwise.
Regrettably, in this case, as in so many matrimonial disputes, the facts
vary from the prototype of the resulting trust. First, the wife's contribution
to the initial purchase came in the form of her deposit of $700 into the joint
bank account from which the purchase monies were paid. It is accepted that
the question of whether or not A has an interest in property purchased by B
with funds from their joint account requires a determination of the intention
of the parties.2' In this case, it was accepted by the appellate courts that the
10 A. Scott, The Laws of Trusts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1939) §404, at 3212.
17 Id.
18Supra note 2, at 303 (D.L.R.), 110 (W.W.R.).
191 d. at 304 (D.L.R.), 110 (W.W.R.).
20 19 Hals.(3d) 841, para. 1372.
21 Dickson J., supra note 2, at 309 (D.L.R.), 116 (W.W.R.), relies on Jones v. May-
nard, [1951] Ch. 572, [1951] 1 All E.R. 802 for this proposition; cf. Re Bishop, Nat. Prov.
Bank Ltd. v. Bishop, [1965] Ch. 450, [1965] 1 All E.R. 249. Cf. Cullity, supra note 14, at
266, where Professor Culity anticipates the concern of Dickson J. (expressed at 116)
that these problems not be solved by awarding the contents of the joint account to the
first to reach the bank.
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OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
intention was to hold a "common purse" from which any investment by the
husband would be held by him on a trust as to one-half the beneficial interest
for the wife.
Second, matrimonial property will rarely in modern times be purchased
outright. More typically, as here, a wife may contribute to a down payment
and then make intermittent contributions of money and labour to complete
the purchase. In many cases, there will be no further financial contribution
after a wife becomes a mother.
22
Third, in most cases the primary contribution of a wife will consist in
the substantial money's worth of her labour. In some cases, as here or in
Trueman v. Trueman,23 that work will be very directly associated with the
acquisition of property.24 Certainly where a farm is to be purchased by the
produce of labour, and a wife generates such produce through extensive
labour, the presumption of resulting trust might be thought to be engaged
with very little violence to its historical and conceptual roots. Yet this is not
the normal case. More typically, the wife's contribution in money's worth
will be somewhat less directly associated with the acquisition of property
by the husband.
As these latter case-types progressively distance themselves from the
prototype of the resulting trust, it becomes less useful as an analytical tool.
This is so because incursions of analysis based on intention inevitably in-
trude and lead to a morass of very problematic fact-finding. First, the parties
are unlikely during the marriage to have given any real thought to the precise
boundaries of the proprietary interest acquired. This would be unbecoming,
and in any event, normally unnecessary. The "cautionary effect" of handing
over "consideration" or signing formal instruments is normally absent from
marriage, by its nature an incautious venture. If an element of intention is
to be relevant, it simply may be absent from many marital cases. Whatever
intention did exist is likely to be difficult to find in fact; it is usually blurred
by the passage of time and by that particular quality of harsh dealing so pre-
valent in matrimonial disputes. In any event, a proven intention at the time
title is taken may not be dispositive of the just result at the dissolution of
the marriage many years later.
•2 The cases of direct or indirect financial contribution have held the most promise
for recovery since the handing down of the judgment in Murdoch. See Re Whiteley v.
Whiteley (1975), 4 O.R.(2d) 393, 48 D.L.R.(3d) 161, 16 R.F.L. 309 (C.A.); Ahone
(Smith) v. Ahone (1975), 56 D.L.R.(3d) 454, 20 R.F.L. 290 (B.C.S.C.); Easton v.
Easton & Bernard (1975), 17 R.F.L. 228 (Ont. S.C.); Cameron (Armstrong) v. Armstrong
(1974), 47 D.L.R.(3d) 720, 17 R.F.L. 332 (B.C.S.C.); Calleja v. Calleja (1974), 4
O.R.(2d) 754, 49 D.L.R. (3d) 202, 16 R.F.L. 339 (S.C.); Kowalchuk v. Kowalchuk
(1974), 45 D.L.R.(3d) 716, 16 R.F.L. 52 (Man. Q.B.); Beztilny v. Beztilny (1977),
27 R.F.L. 393 (Alta. S.C.); More v. More (1974), 17 R.F.L. 5 (B.C.S.C.); Ramer v.
Ramer (1975), 22 R.F.L. 232 (Ont. S.C.); and Madisso v. Madisso (1976), 11 O.R.(2d)
441, 66 D.L.R.(3d) 385, 21 R.F.L. 51 (C.A.).
23 [1971] 2 W.W.R. 688, 18 D.L.R.(3d) 109, 5 R.F.L. 54 (Alta. C.A.).
2 4 See also Koshmen v. Koshmen (1976), 27 R.F.L. 249 (Sask. Q.B.); Borek v.
Borek & Rorek Ranch Ltd. (1976), 27 R.F.L. 352 (Alta. S.C.); Gerk v. Gerk (1975),
25 R.F.L. 32 (Alta. S.C.); contra Bussey v. Bussey (1975), 8 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 504
(Nfld. S.C.).
[VOL. 16, NO. 3
Case Comments
In Murdoch v. Murdoch, the present Chief Justice surveyed these diffi-
culties in shaping the resulting trust doctrines to accommodate the modem
marriage.25 He concluded that "[i]t is necessary to bend or adapt them to the
desired end because the constructive trust more easily serves the purpose.
26
It is to this subject we now turn.
V. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
Although the Court was thus able to premise proprietary relief on the
theory of a resulting trust, Dickson J. went on to consider the possible appli-
cation of the constructive remedy to these facts. Despite the fact that this
portion of his judgment is, properly speaking, obiter dicta, it may be that this
aspect of the Rathwell decision will constitute an enduring contribution to
Commonwealth jurisprudence on this subject. Before turning to a considera-
tion of Dickson J.'s discussion of the constructive trust, it will be useful to
outline the general nature of the confusions which have plagued judicial dis-
cussion of this subject in recent years.
The analytical difficulties which have arisen in the course of attempts
by English and Canadian courts to derive guidance from the decisions of the
House of Lords in Pettitt v. Pettitt and Gissing v. Gissing have been cata-
logued by others. 27 It is sufficient to note here that, in these cases, two differ-
ent questions have arisen in tandem in such a way as to inhibit clear discussion
of either. The first (and less contentious) question relates to the proper defini-
tion of the constructive trust, and its relation to implied (or resulting) trusts
on the one hand and to the unjust enrichment principle on the other. This,
of course, is a broad question of doctrinal analysis. The answer is to be
sought by examining the various uses given in the case law to constructive and
resulting trusts, and by considering the extent to which constructive trusts
may properly be said to be implied trusts, i.e., premised on an intent to hold
beneficially which may, in fact, be inferred from all the circumstances, or are
more correctly described as trusts imposed by law, i.e., in the absence of facts
giving rise to such an inference, in order to prevent an unjust enrichment.
The second (and much more difficult) question arising in these cases is
whether a spouse who has taken legal title to property ought to be considered
to hold beneficial title for the other spouse in the absence of some intention,
either express or implied, to do so. This question raises a much more specific
issue than the first. More importantly, the proper solution to this problem
is not dictated by choosing one or the other of the two contending views
relating to the first question. Resolution of the dispute as to the proper theo-
retical basis of the constructive trust does not, in our view, carry with it a
predetermined or logically necessary solution to the problems posed by the
ownership of matrimonial property.
The first question, then, is of more general significance for legal theory
25 Supra note 1, at 454-55 (S.C.R.), 387-88 (D.L.R.), 382 (W.W.R.).
26 Id. at 455 (S.C.R.), 388 (D.L.R.), 382 (W.W.R.).
2 7 See especially, the valuable comment by Professor Waters in (1975), 53 Can. B.
Rev. 366.
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than the second and is obviously a matter of great consequence to the law of
restitution. The modem analysis of restitutionary problems may be dated
from the publication of the Restatement of Restitution,28 which attempted
to restate the old common law of quasi-contract and the equitable rules of
constructive trust in an orderly and rational manner. Both of these areas of the
law had suffered at the hands of theories which suggested that they were merely
implied versions of the mother institutions, contract and trust. Quasi-contracts
had been considered by many to be merely implied contracts, constructive
trusts to be merely implied trusts. The Restatement pointed out2" that the
implied contractual intent relied on in the prior quasi-contract case law was,
for the most part, completely fictional, and further, the Restatement clearly
dissociated constructive trusts from trusts which arose by implication.8 0 The
general principle manifested in both of these areas, it was said, is simply that
one ought not be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.31 The Restate-
ment then went on, of course, to restate the many explicit rules that had been
developed in the prior cases to govern what might now be called instances
of unjust enrichment.
There may be said, then, to be two schools of thought on the question
of the theoretical basis of quasi-contractual restitutionary liability, the implied
intent school and the unjust enrichment school. The charge levelled against
the former by the latter is that of arid conceptualism. It is impossible to ex-
plain the results of case law on the basis of implied intent, it is argued, and
accordingly, reliance on such notions obscures proper analysis and will, if
followed strictly, occasionally lead to incorrect decisions.
Similarly, there are two schools of thought on the question of the theo-
retical basis of the constructive trust, the implied trust school and the unjust
enrichment school. The situation here is not precisely parallel to the debate
in quasi-contract, for no one would seriously contend that constructive trusts
are premised on an implied intention to hold beneficially. Nonetheless, it is
felt by the implied trust school that the constructive trust is, in some rather
vague sense, a real or substantive trust and thus properly considered to be a
member of the trust family.3 2 The unjust enrichment school, on the other
hand, argues that inasmuch as the constructive trust does not arise from inten-
tion (express or implied) it is obviously a trust imposed as a remedial device
to prevent the constructive trustee from inequitably withholding property
which ought, for reasons of fairness, to be disgorged. It is, in short, a remedy
that is employed to prevent unjust enrichment.88 Failure to articulate the
28 Restatement of the Law of Restitution (St. Paul: American Law Institute, 1937).
29 Id. at 4-9.
30 ld. at 640-42.
31 Id. at 11-15, 642-43.
= See R. Goff and G. Jones, The Law of Restitution (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1966) at 36-37. For an early attempt to persuade an English audience of the merits of
the unjust enrichment view, see A. Scott, Constructive Trusts (1955), 71 L.Q. Rev. 39.
33 For a recent assessment by an English writer of the arguments for and against
the view that the constructive trust is a remedy rather than a substantive trust, see I.
Riddall, The Law of Trusts (London: Butterworths, 1977) at 315-20. Our own view is
that there is not much light to be generated by arguments as to whether the constructive
(VOL. 16, NO. 3
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underlying principle of the constructive trust, it is thought, not only obscures
our understanding of its true nature, but may prevent us from seeing clearly
the full range of situations in which it may apply.
In Canada, although not in England, the unjust enrichment view has
clearly gained the ascendancy in the quasi-contractual stream of restitutionary
law. In Deglman,34 the Supreme Court allowed a claim in quantum meruit
on the basis of the unjust enrichment principle in a situation where implied
contract theory would have dictated the opposite result. This approach has
been followed in other areas of the law deriving from the old authorities on
quasi-contract.25 Thus, a clear distinction is now drawn in our case law be-
tween implied contracts, which rest on inferred contractual intent (which are
true contracts) and "implied" contracts, which do not rest on inferred intent.
The latter are not truly contractual obligations and are now more properly
described as obligations imposed by law in order to prevent an unjust enrich-
ment.
The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet authoritatively proclaimed
that the unjust enrichment approach offers the proper juristic basis for the
constructive trust. Nor, of course, has the House of Lords.36 In Canada, many
observers would agree that this is an event which simply awaits the right
occasion. Rand J. certainly hinted at this in a decision of the Court rendered
in 1946. 37 Further, in a recent case,38 the Court awarded an accounting to
prevent a fiduciary from profiting from his position and linked such relief
to the concept of unjust enrichment. It would be most astonishing if the same
principle would not be said to underlie the imposition of a constructive trust
on a fiduciary for the same purpose. However, the fact that the constructive
trust has, at this important point in the development of restitutionary law,
been swept into the heated arena of the matrimonial property disputes seems
to have militated against a clear pronouncement on this question at the
present time.
trust is, in English law, truly remedial. It is clear that it is imposed regardless of inten-
tion. In that sense, it is not at all like other trusts and its juristic basis must be found
outside the trust rationale (i.e., a voluntarily assumed duty to hold beneficially). See
further, text accompanying note 56, infra.
34 DegIman v. Guaranty Trust Co. & Constantineau, [1954] S.C.R. 725, 3 D.L.R.
785. See generally, J. McCamus, Restitutionary Remedies, [1975] LSUC Special Lectures
255.
sr, See, e.g., Carleton (County) v. Ottawa, [1965] S.C.R. 663, 52 D.L.R.(2d) 220
(discharge of another's liability); and Rural Municipality of Storthoaks v. Mobil Oil
Canada Ltd., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 147, 55 D.L.R.(3d) 1 (recovery of money paid under a
mistake of fact).
a Lord Denning, however, has been a strong advocate of the unjust enrichment
approach. See Hussey v. Palmer, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1286, [1972] 3 All E.R. 744 (C.A.).
See also, G. Strathy, The Constructive Trust as a Restitutionary Remedy: The Case of
Hussey v. Palmer (1974), 32 Fac. L. Rev. U. of T. 83.
37 In Pahara v. Pahara, [1946] S.C.R. 89, [1946] 1 D.L.R. 433, Rand J., imposing
a constructive trust remedy, said at 94 (S.C.R.), 437 (D.L.R.): "Against the unjust
enrichment following that fraud, an equitable right to restitution is raised in favour of
the respondent..."
38 Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley, [1974] S.C.R. 592, 40 D.L.R.(3d) 371
per Laskin J.
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Although restitution scholars may take some unaccustomed pride in
seeing an aspect of their subject emerge to take central stage in the resolution
of a legal and social problem of obvious importance and high visibility, this
development may be viewed as something of a mixed blessing. The matri-
monial property disputes have proven to be a very difficult context in which
to think clearly about the juristic basis of the constructive trust for a number
of reasons. Two schools of thought have emerged in the English and Canadian
case law on the question of the proper basis for resolving matrimonial prop-
erty disputes. Described by Dickson J. as the "justice and equity" school
and the "intent" school, the former may be said, in general terms, to favour
the exercise of a broadly based judicial discretion to effect an allocation of
property interests which is just in all the circumstances,30 whereas the latter
holds to the view that beneficial property interests in matrimonial property
are created only where there is an actual intention, either expressly stated or
to be inferred from circumstantial evidence, to hold beneficially for another.
As Dickson J. noted, "The charge raised against the former school is that
of dispensing 'palm-tree' justice; against the latter school, that of meaning-
less ritual in searching for a phantom intent. '40 The theoretical debate con-
cerning the nature of the constructive trust has been catapulted into the midst
of this imbroglio inasmuch as some members of the "justice and equity"
school have hitched their wagon to the unjust enrichment star and have urged
that the constructive trust, freed from implied intent and rooted in the unjust
enrichment principle, is the proper vehicle for the exercise of a discretion to
effect a just allocation of interests in matrimonial property. In this way, the
impression has been created that the fate of the constructive trust is inex-
tricably linked with the fate of the "justice and equity" approach to matri-
monial property disputes. This impression is, we argue, erroneous. Indeed,
it would be most unfortunate if this were not so, in that it now seems clear
that the "justice and equity" school (at least in its most unstructured form)
has been consigned to judicial oblivion in both England and Canada.
41
Further difficulty is created by the failure of the matrimonial property
"intent" school to define its terms clearly and consistently. First, though the
"intent" adherents agree that the court is not to impose ex cathedra the allo-
cation to which reasonable spouses would agree, there is persisting ambiguity
in the judgements as to the precise basis on which the intention of the parties
can be implied. Thus, though it is clearly established in England after deci-
39 It is to some extent an oversimplification to lump all of the non-intent school under
the "justice and equity" label. Thus, the discretion favoured by Lord Denning in Appleton
v. Appleton, [1965] 1 W.L.R. 25, [1965] 1 All E.R. 44 at 46 (C.A.) (".... I prefer to
take the simple test: What is reasonable and fair in the circumstances as they have
developed, seeing that they are circumstances which no one contemplated before?") is
more loosely structured than that suggested by Lord Diplock in Pettitt v. Pettitt, supra
note 15, at 823 (A.C.), 413-14 (All E.R.) (". . . the court imputes to the parties a
common intention which in fact they never formed and it does so by forming its own
opinion as to what would have been the common intention of reasonable men as to the
effect of that event on their contractual rights and obligations if the possibility of the
event happening had been present to their minds at the time of entering into the contract.").
4 0 Supra note 2, at 297 (D.L.R.), 103 (W.W.R.).
41 Supra note 15.
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sions of the House of Lords in Pettitt and Gissing that beneficial title to
matrimonial property arises only in situations where there is a common
spousal intent to this effect, it is not clear whether this must always be an
intention proved to exist in fact. Some members of the House have said
straightforwardly that "the court does not find and, indeed, cannot find that
there was some thought in the mind of a person which was never there at
all." 42 And yet, the continued use of traditional resulting trust doctrine does
seem to open the door to inferences of intent that come very close to the
imputation of reasonable intentions to the parties, without an overly zealous
concern to find persuasive evidence that the intention did, in fact, exist.
Lord Diplock, in Gissing, reluctantly accepted the actual intention rule, and
went on to say that in this branch of English law, "effect is given to the infer-
ences as to the intentions of the parties to a transaction which a reasonable
man would draw from their words or conduct and not to any subjective in-
tention or absence of intention which was not made manifest at the time of
the transaction itself."'43 On this view, there appears to remain some oppor-
tunity to employ the common intent rule as a Trojan horse for the imposi-
tion of an objective standard of reasonableness.
44
Discussion of these issues is further obscured by the failure of the "in-
tent" school to clarify the meaning to be given to the terms "resulting" and
"constructive" trusts. As a result, the distinction between these concepts has,
in this context at least, become blurred. A majority of the Lords appear to
refer to "resulting implied or constructive" trusts as if these terms were
interchangeable, 45 no doubt for the reason suggested by Lord Diplock in
Gissing that it is "unnecessary for present purposes to distinguish between
these three classes of trust. ' 46 The "present purposes" referred to, of course,
are the resolution of matrimonial property disputes and if one accepts a strict
view of the intent requirement in these cases, it is quite true that there is
nothing to be gained in drawing careful distinctions between resulting and
constructive trusts. The short answer in all cases is that some evidence of
real intention is a necessary prerequisite to the creation of beneficial interests.
Indeed, if this approach is accepted, there is no point in mentioning the con-
structive trust in this context at all. In these disputes, it would simply have
no application. Reference is made by the courts to "resulting implied or con-
structive" trusts presumably only because of the legislative provisions that
these classes of trust are all exempt from the usual requirement of writing.
47
42 See Pettitt v. Pettitt, supra note 15, at 804 (A.C.), 398 (All E.R.) per Lord
Morris of Borth-y-Gest.
43 Gissing v. Gissing, [1971] A.C. 886 at 906, [1970] 2 All E.R. 780 at 790-91.
44 See, e.g., Falconer v. Falconer, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1333, [1970] 3 All E.R. 449 at
452 perLord Denning (C.A.).
45 See, e.g., Gissing v. Gissing, supra note 43, at 898 (A.C.), 783 (All E.R.) per
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest.
46 Id. at 905 (A.C.), 790 (All E.R.).
47 See Gissing v. Gissing, supra note 43, at 904-05 (A.C.) per Lord Diplock; The
Law of Property Act, 1925, 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, s. 53 (U.K.):
(1) ... (a) no interest in land can be created or disposed of except by writing
... or by operation of law; (b) a declaration of trust respecting any land or any
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To lump them together in this way in the present context, however, adds a
further element of conceptual chaos to the judicial discussion of these
problems.
In Murdoch, the Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to lead us
out of this wilderness. The majority opinion of Martland J. appears to accept
the common intent approach of the House of Lords but preserves all of its
ambiguity by relying, in part, on the somewhat opaque passage from Lord
Diplock's judgment quoted above.48 Laskin J., in dissent, argued forcefully
for the application of a constructive trust/unjust enrichment analysis, but this
was apparently neither pleaded nor argued by the parties and Laskin J.'s
views on this point were neither mentioned nor responded to in the majority
opinion.49 Lower courts attempting to follow the majority opinion who wished
to award recovery were thus obliged to find some basis for inferring intent
to hold beneficially. Where there is a will, of course, a way can often be
found and one cannot fail to observe that rather slender evidence of intent
will suffice in situations where a sharing of the asset in question seems just.50
The prospects for clear thinking and plain speaking with respect to these
problems have been considerably enhanced by Dickson J.'s judgment in
Rathwell. In the first place, Dickson I. attempted to untangle the muddle
that has arisen from the failure to distinguish clearly between the underlying
theories of resulting and constructive trusts. The critical distinction rests on
intent. "[A] resulting trust," said Dickson J., "is concerned with the intent of
the transferor. ."51 And again, "[r]esulting trusts are as firmly grounded in
the settlor's intent as are express trusts, but with this difference-the intent
is inferred or is presumed as a matter of law from the circumstances of the
case."52 With the constructive trust, on the other hand, ". . . the court im-
poses, irrespective of the intention of the parties but in accordance with good
conscience, a duty upon A to hold title for B."8' 3 This much, to be sure, is
completely noncontentious. If one canvasses the existing Anglo-Canadian
interest therein must be manifested and proved by some writing signed by some
person who is able to declare such trust or by his will;...
(2) This section does not affect the creation or operation of resulting, implied or
constructive trusts.
See also The Statute of Frauds, R.S.O. 1970, c. 444, s. 10.
48 Supra note 43.
49 On this basis, Dickson J. concluded, in Rathwell, that he was not precluded from
considering the matter afresh. Supra note 2, at 313 (D.L.R.), 121 (W.W.R.).50 Whether or not this is a correct interpretation of the effect of Murdoch, the
lower courts apparently find some difficulty in resisting the urge to "find" intention in
order to effect a just allocation. The following comment of Professor Waters, supra note
27, at 377, is appropriate: "It is impossible to resist the conclusion that the lower courts
today are pressing for a discretionary remedy permitting them to do justice and equity
between husband and wife. As in England, most Canadian courts are able to do just
that by a careful handling of the criteria required by the intent school." See also,
Murdoch v. Murdoch, supra note 1, at 448 (S.C.R.), 384 (D.L.R.), 378 (W.W.R.) per
Laskin J. (noting the occurrence of this phenomenon in England).
51 Supra note 2, at 303 (D.L.R.), 109 (W.W.R.).
52 Id. at 303 (D.L.R.), 110 (W.W.R.).
53 Id. at 303 (D.L.R.), 109 (W.W.R.).
[VOL. 16, NO. 3
Case Comments
case law on the constructive trust, one signal unifying feature stands out. The
constructive trust "is imposed irrespective of intention; indeed, it is imposed
quite against the wishes of the constructive trustee."54
Somewhat more controversial, perhaps, is Dickson J.'s view that the
constructive trust is premised on the principle of unjust enrichment. Relying,
in part, on Laskin J.'s comments in Murdoch, Dickson J. stated:
The constructive trust amounts to a third head of obligation, quite distinct from
contract and tort, in which the court subjects "a person holding title to property
... to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would
be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it" ..55
Again, however, the point is not very contentious. If one accepts, as one must,
that constructive trusts are not based on intention, what alternative theories
of liability can be marshalled in its support? When one examines the existing
uses of the constructive trust-the preventing of a criminal from profitting
from his crime, imposing trust duties on parties who have acquired title
through fraud, unconscionable conduct or undue influence, depriving a fidu-
ciary of profits secured from his position, imposing trust duties on strangers
to an express trust, and so on-it is clear that any abstract generalization
that would be employed to articulate a theme common to all of these instances
would have to speak in terms of unfair or unjust retention of a benefit which
equity has determined ought, in conscience, to be restored to the other
party.56 The genius of the Restatement was to recognize that the same theme
could be observed on the common law side in the context of the quasi-
contractual remedies and further, that it would be useful to organize the rules
developed in these two areas around a common organizing principle ex-
pressing this general theme, the principle of unjust enrichment.
Acceptance of the Restatement's approach does not involve the over-
ruling of centuries of precedents on the constructive trust, nor does it involve
adopting a rule of law to the effect that anything which may be vaguely char-
acterized as an "unjust enrichment" gives rise to a cause of action which will
result in a constructive trust. Recognition of the general principle simply
affirms that constructive trusts are not implied trusts in the sense of being
premised on implied intent and further, indicates that the general theme
unifying the constructive trust cases is retention of benefit in circumstances
where it is unjust to do so. For a complete catalogue of established rules
determining when such circumstances arise, we look, of course, to the reported
54Id. at 305 (D.L.R.), 112 (W.W.R.).
55 Id.
56 Apart from the standard English works on equity and trusts, see generally, D.
Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1974) at chapter 11. Also see,
A. Oakley, Has the Constructive Trust Become a General Equitable Remedy? (1973),
26 Curr. Leg. Prob. 17; and R. Maudsley, Constructive Trusts (1977), 28 N.I. Leg. Q.
123. The latter writer, the current editor of Hanbury's Modern Equity (10th ed. Lon-
don: Stevens, 1976), lists the commonly recognized categories and states (at 138-39)
that the following general principle may be extracted from them:
They are all cases of Unjust Enrichment; where, if the defendant were not re-
quired to disgorge, he would be enriched at the expense of the plaintiff in a way
which would be unjust.
19781
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
case law on the constructive trust. In essence, then, adoption of the unjust
enrichment principle is largely a matter of conceptual housekeeping. Thus,
given the fact that the Supreme Court has clearly recognized the principle in
the quasi-contractual context and, further, given that there are previous refer-
ences to the concept in the Canadian constructive trust case law, 7 Dickson
J.'s views on this matter ought not be regarded, we argue, as a provocative
pronouncement on an issue on which judicial opinion is, in this country,
seriously divided. Indeed, it is important to note that neither the Murdoch
majority nor the Rathwell concurring judgments argue to the contrary.
The much more difficult point, of course,-and here there may be seri-
ous division-is whether a constructive trust doctrine has a role to play in
matrimonial property disputes. On this question, Dickson J.'s opinion is boldly
innovative and, though his views are for the most part adumbrated in Laskin
J.'s dissent in Murdoch, his judgment constitutes an original and thoughtful
contribution to the analysis of these problems.
To give the Murdoch majority their due, there is little, if anything, in
the previous constructive trust case law which could, by simple extension of
existing rules, provide a basis for awarding a constructive trust to the untitled
spouse. Recognition of the unjust enrichment principle may well have the
effect of encouraging the courts to reason by analogy from previous case law
and to extend the application of established doctrine to new fact situations.
But from what existing constructive trust rule would one fashion such an
argument? Speaking very generally, the existing uses of the constructive trust
ensure that parties who behave wrongfully or inequitably, committing crimes,
exerting coercion, breaching fiduciary duties, failing to live up to undertakings,
etc., are relieved of the ill-gotten gains produced by this conduct. If Mr.
Rathwell had induced detrimental reliance from his wife, having encouraged
her to believe that she would share ownership of the property, the materials
are at hand in the proprietary estoppel cases for imposing a constructive
trust.5 8 But, in the absence of such conduct, what has Mr. Rathwell done that
would attract the displeasure of equity on traditional principles? A further
difficulty may be noted. Previous constructive trust doctrine suggests that the
inequitable conduct must relate to the acquisition of the property which is
to become subject to the constructive trust. Does the provision of services
by a spouse have this connection with property or ought it to be the subject
of restitutionary recovery, if at all, in quantum meruit for the value of the
services rendered?
If we must, therefore, concede that legal history is on the side of the
Murdoch majority, social history, as Lord Diplock eloquently argued in
57 Apart from the Pahara case referred to, supra note 37, see Schobelt v. Barber,
[1967] 1 O.R. 349 (H.C.); lirna Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada Ltd., [1970] 3 O.R.
629, 13 D.L.R.(3d) 645 (H.C.), rev'd on other grounds [1972] 1 O.R. 251 (C.A.),
affd (1973), 40 D.L.R.(3d) 303 (S.C.C.); and Re Dreger (1976), 12 O.R.(2d) 371
(H.C.).
58 See, e.g., Binion v. Evans, [1972] 2 All E.R. 70 (C.A.). See generally, Hanbury,
supra note 56, at 660-66, and R. Megarry and P. Baker, eds., Snell's Principles of Equity
(27th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1973) at 185-86. Also see, Gissing v. Gissing,
supra note 43, at 905 (A.C.), 790 (All E.R.) per Lord Diplock.
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Pettitt,59 is on the opposite side. But if, as is usually the case, our private law
is to follow the path of social history incrementally and on a principled basis
(the more dramatic moves being left to the legislature), what analytical step
will bring constructive trust machinery into closer accord with modem expec-
tations as to the division of matrimonial property?
The solution proposed by Dickson J. rests on an extension of the notion
of inequitable conduct to embrace the proposition that it is unjust to acquire
property at another's expense in the absence of contract or gift. The critical
passage in the judgment is the following:
As a matter of principle, the court will not allow any man unjustly to appropriate
to himself the value earned by the labours of another. That principle is not de-
feated by the existence of a matrimonial relationship between the parties; but, for
the principle to succeed, the facts must display an enrichment, a corresponding
deprivation and the absence of any juristic reason-such as a contract or disposi-
tion of law-for the enrichment.60
The underlying moral premise is a familiar one. One ought not to reap where
one has not sown. And there can be little doubt that this notion is at the very
foundation of the unjust enrichment principle. Why, for example, do the
courts award recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact? Nothing turns
on the nature of the recipient's conduct. It is simply perceived that it is unjust
to receive a windfall benefit at the payer's expense. 61 If Dickson J.'s analysis
thus represents something of a departure from prior constructive trust law,
it is one which is clearly rooted in the unjust enrichment principle.
If the principle is to apply, however, some connection must be shown
between the acquisition of the property and the corresponding deprivation.
Dickson J. states the question in these terms:
Where a common intention is clearly lacking and cannot be presumed but a
spouse does contribute to family life, the court has the difficult task of deciding
whether there is any causal connection between the contribution and the disputed
asset. It has to assess whether the contribution was such as enabled the spouse
with title to acquire the asset in dispute. That will be a question of fact to be
found in the circumstances of the particular case. If the answer is affirmative,
then the spouse with title becomes accountable as a constructive trustee."
On the Rathwell facts, this test was met.2
Analyzing the facts from the remedial perspective of constructive trust, it is clear
that only through the efforts of Mrs. Rathwell was Mr. Rathwell able to acquire
the lands in question. Assuming, arguendo, that Mrs. Rathwell had made no
capital contribution to the acquisitions, it would be unjust, in all of the circum-
stances, to allow Mr. Rathwell to retain the benefit of his wife's labours. His
acquisition of legal title was made possible only through "joint effort" and "team
work" as he himself testified; he cannot now deny his wife's beneficial entitlement.63
The spouses had worked de facto as a partnership. This does not render them
59 See Pettitt v. Pettitt, supra note 15, at 825 (A.C.), 414-15 (All E.R.).
60 Supra note 2, at 306 (D.L.R.), 113-14 (W.W.R.).
61 Cf. J. McCamus, The Self-Serving Intermeddler and the Law of Restitution
(1978), 16 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 at 515 at 522-23.
02 Supra note 2, at 306 (D.L.R.), 112-13 (D.L.R.).
63Id. at 310 (D.L.R.), 118 (W.W.R.).
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partners de jure,64 but it does render it unjust for Mr. Rathwell to retain,
exclusively for his own benefit, the product of their joint efforts. Any agree-
ment to the contrary would, of course, be recognized though the taking of
legal title by one spouse will obviously not be considered conclusive evidence
of such an agreement.
In this way, then, Dickson J. provides a principled basis for extending
the constructive trust into the analysis of matrimonial property problems. It
must be noted, however, that Dickson J. has not provided a hook on which
the "justice and equity" school can peg its desire to impose in all situations
the property allocation that would be agreed to by reasonable parties. Dickson
J.'s analysis does not introduce a doctrine of "family assets," nor does it pro-
vide a basis for dividing up matrimonial property simply because modem
notions of the nature of marriage suggest that it would, as a general rule, be
fair to do so. Professor Waters has forcefully argued the case for this ap-
proach,65 and perhaps it could be accommodated to traditional constructive
trust doctrine by arguing that, in the light of a clear social consensus, a shar-
ing of matrimonial property is part and parcel of the modem institution of
marriage, and it is therefore inequitable to refuse to share such property on
reasonable terms.66 In any event, however, it is clear that Dickson 3. has not
attempted to carry the doctrine this far. Indeed, he has charted a middle
course, clearly rooted in the unjust enrichment principle, which will prevent
only the most extreme forms of unjust retention, the refusal to share property
whose very acquisition has been made possible through joint effort.
If Dickson J.'s views be accepted, one further matter of conceptual
housekeeping may be attempted. Dickson J.'s constructive trust analysis evi-
dently overlaps with some of the traditional resulting trust doctrine. In Rath-
well itself, the plaintiff could rely on either doctrine. "The presumption of
common intention from her contribution in money and money's worth entitles
her to succeed in resulting trust. Her husband's unjust enrichment entitles
her to succeed in constructive trust.16 7 Insofar as the presumption of intent
speaks to an inference that such an intent did, in fact, exist, the constructive
trust is quite unnecessary. The intent of the parties shall govern. But insofar
as the presumption speaks only to a fictional intent, is the issue not more
directly and elegantly addressed as one of unjust enrichment? It may well be,
of course, that the wife has made a capital contribution without any thought
(or intention) with respect to the property consequences. This is the case that
troubled Lord Reid in Gissing.68 If the parties honestly testify to this effect,
do they not make a mockery of our presumed intent? Yet, would we not still,
as Lord Reid did, wish to apportion the property? And surely, this is for the
reason indicated by the analysis of Dickson J., that it is unjust for the titled
6 4 Murdoch v. Murdoch, supra note 1.
65 See Waters, supra note 27, at 378-81.
667Te marital relationship would itself be presumed to give rise to a tacit under-
taking to share which could then form the basis for an extension of the proprietary
estoppel case law. See supra note 58.
67 Supra note 2, at 307 (D.L.R.), 114 (W.W.R.).
68 Gissing v. Gissing, supra note 43, at 897 (A.C.), 783 (All E.R.).
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spouse to appropriate the product of his spouse's contribution, to harvest,
in effect, another's crop. The clarity of our analysis would thus be enhanced if
we reserved resulting trust analysis for true cases of implied intent (intent
implied in fact) and left the cases of intent implied or presumed as a matter
of law for constructive trust analysis.
There is an interesting and illuminating parallel here in the clarification
of our analysis of quasi-contract which resulted from the recognition of the
unjust enrichment principle. Some of the earlier implied contract case law
clearly rested on the finding of intentions implied in fact while the remainder
were premised on presumed intent. Only the latter, of course, are now viewed
as involving restitutionary liability grounded on the unjust enrichment prin-
ciple. The former are properly considered to be true contracts. Similarly, we
may be approaching the point where a clear distinction can be drawn between
true trusts and restitutionary constructive trust obligations. The former cate-
gory would consist of express trusts and those resulting trusts based on inten-
tions implied in fact; the latter would consist of those resulting trusts resting
on fictional intent and, of course, of the traditional constructive (or non-
intentional) trusts. The gain resulting from clear recognition of this distinction
would be, as it was on the quasi-contract side, to spare us the embarrassment
of arguing for the discovery of intentions in situations where experience tells
us that they are unlikely to exist.
In sum, then, Dickson J.'s judgment makes a limited, but useful, incur-
sion into the matrimonial property arena. In addition to the substantive trust
machinery which is brought into play when a contribution in money or money's
worth to the acquisition of the property entitles us to infer an intention to
hold beneficially, we are provided with a basis for imposing a remedial trust
where, even though a basis for a trust inference is lacking, the contribution
of the non-titled spouse has a causal connection with the acquisition of the
asset.
Our previous experience with notions of causation, particularly in the
area of tort law,6 may lead us to greet the arrival of a rule premised on causal
connection with some circumspection. And indeed, there may be reason for
concern that its use in the present context may lead to analytical difficulties.
If we fixate on the causation question as the basis for relief, do we not run
the risk of ignoring other considerations which appear to be material? Many
individuals may have causal link to the acquisition or improvement of prop-
erty. In addition to the farm wife, what of the work contribution of the chil-
dren, of relatives, of a hired hand working in return for accommodation,
and so on. Further, is it every contribution which has the effect of saving
the other party an expense which will give rise to a proprietary interest? Or
must it be, in some sense, a substantial contribution? Or must it be, in some
sense, directly related to the land in question? It seems doubtful that such
questions will be resolved by reliance solely on the causation issue. Of course,
cases of gift or services rendered under a contract of service are easily dis-
tinguished. Absenting such considerations, however, it may be that an addi-
69 See H. L. A. Hart and A. HonorS, Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1959).
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tional factor to the effect that the plaintiff's involvement is suggestive of a
shared enterprise will be critical. In Rathwell, the acquisition of title was
made possible through "joint effort" and "team work." On this question,
evidence of "joint intent" might be very helpful. No doubt, it will be easier
to find the existence of this spirit of joint venture in a matrimonial relation-
ship and, within that relationship, especially with respect to the matrimonial
home. Needless to say, the remedial trust is not limited to such situations,
70
but one suspects that as the relationship between the parties becomes less
intense and the extent of the contribution becomes less substantial, the argu-
ment from cause will be less warmly received than it was in Rathwell.
One final note of caution may be sounded. It should be emphasized that
the causal test propounded by Dickson . does not, and could not, offer an
explanation for the great variety of established uses of the constructive trust
in restitutionary law. It would be most inapt to attempt to describe many
of its existing uses as situations in which the plaintiff's conduct has caused
the defendant's proprietary gain. What Dickson J. has done, however, is to
extend the notion of "inequitable conduct" to capture the Rathwell fact situ-
ation, and he has thus made a useful addition to the store of analysis and
argumentation supporting the remedial use of the constructive trust.
VI. A PERSONAL REMEDY?
Dickson J. has thus offered an analysis which indicates when a pro-
prietary interest should arise in these cases on the basis of the unjust enrich-
ment principle. A question which has not been addressed in the matrimonial
context is whether the in personam remedy of quantum meruit may have
some operation on the theory that unless compensation for services rendered
is ordered, the spouse who has had the benefit of the labours of the other
spouse will be unjustly enriched.
Assume, for example, that Mrs. Rathwell's farm work could not be
causally linked to the acquisition of the farm. (We may hypothesize that the
farm was purchased outright by the husband's winnings from the Olympic
lottery). On the basis of Dickson J.'s analysis, a constructive trust is not
available. Would it be inappropriate to award quantum meruit for the value
of services rendered?
The existing case law, in which Deglman7I takes a central place, suggests
that such relief should be available only where the services were rendered in
an expectation of compensation which the recipient either induced or ought
to have appreciated and the recipient has, in breach of this understanding,
failed to compensate. Deglman's aunt promised land in return for his services.
That agreement was unenforceable for lack of writing, but the alternative
relief of quantum meruit was made available in order to prevent her unjust
enrichment.
70 See, e.g., Becker v. Pettkus, unreported, June 20, 1978 (Ont. C.A.), applying
Rathwell (and, in particular, the reasoning of Dickson J.) to an unmarried couple. Also
see, Marvin v. Marvin, 134 Cal. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1976); and Case
Comment, Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation: Marvin 1'.
Marvin (1977), 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1708.
71 Supra note 34.
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The closest analogy to the matrimonial context arises in those cases
where a "common law" spouse or housekeeper provides services on the faith
of an undertaking that the supplier will be "looked after" or "remembered
in the will."'72 The expectations of Mrs. Rathwell, and other spouses who
withdrew their services from the market place in order to build a home life
and provide the supporting services typically incidental to this role, may not
be very different in nature.
It may be difficult, or simply inaccurate, however, to view the conduct
of the employed spouse upon dissolution of the marriage as approximating
the failure to live up to an understanding to compensate which typifies the con-
duct of the restitutionary defendant. Here, the better analogy, as Lord Diplock
hints in Pettitt,7" is that of a frustrated agreement.74 The parties have entered
into a relationship in which, perhaps, one spouse has foregone employment
opportunities and gladly rendered housekeeping services and in some cases,
as in Rathwell, other services which would ordinarily be purchased in the
market place on the shared assumption that material needs would be met
for the indefinite future from the income of the employed spouse. These as-
sumptions (which are not present in all marital relationships, of course)
are invalidated by the termination of the relationship.
Where the services rendered are of a kind normally purchased, and
where they contribute to the success of the employed spouse's commercial
ventures (Mrs. Rathwell's labours on the farm, the services of the wife of a
young lawyer who acts as typist and receptionist without pay) the unjust
enrichment argument obviously has greater force and, arguably, finds closer
support from the existing authorities. Where the services in question consti-
tute homemaking activity of the kind normally undertaken by the non-
employed spouse, the analysis supporting relief is more tenuous. It may be
that the sharing of income and the assumption of household expenses by the
employed spouse, which normally accompanies such relationships, would be
taken by the parties to be a return, of sorts, for the services rendered. The
subtle texture of such relationships is such that it seems artificial to view the
spouse who has been employed outside the home as one who has been un-
justly enriched by the receipt of housekeeping services for which some com-
pensation now ought to be paid. The spouse who has developed a successful
business venture utilizing, in part, the labours of the other spouse, is more
easily seen as one who has benefitted in a way that stands apart from the
normal marital exchange and who therefore should be obligated, in view of
the change in circumstances, to pay for the benefit received.
72 See, e.g., Foster v. Henderson, [1955] O.W.N. 660, [1955] 3 D.L.R. 408 (H.C.),
var'd [1956] O.W.N. 53 (C.A.); and Rowe v. Public Trustee, [1963] 2 O.R. 71, 38
D.L.R.(2d) 462 (H.C.). Some courts have indicated a disinclination to view such under-
standings as evidence that the services were given in the expectation of compensation.
See, e.g., Swan v. Public Trustee, [1972] 3 W.W.R. 696 (Alta. S.C.).
73 Supra note 15, at 823 (A.C.), 413-14 (All E.R.).
74The right of a party to a frustrated agreement to restitution for the value of
benefits conferred is established at common law and in provincial frustrated contracts
legislation. See Fibrosa Spolka Akcyina v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd.,
[1943] A.C. 32, [1942] 2 All E.R. 122. Also see, e.g., The Frustrated Contracts Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 185.
1978]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
In short, the prospects for quantum meruit relief for services rendered
during marriage appear to be very limited. Nonetheless, where the services
rendered are of a kind normally paid for, and where they have contributed to
the other spouse's commercial success, the granting of restitutionary relief to
prevent an unjust enrichment would not involve a substantial departure from
existing doctrine.
VII. CONCLUSION
The opinion of Dickson J. in Rathwell offers a valuable analysis of the
interaction of resulting and constructive trusts in the allocation of matrimonial
property upon dissolution of marriage. In particular, he has demonstrated
that in cases other than the prototype fact situation of resulting trust (a con-
tribution in money or money's worth which warrants the inference of an
intention to hold beneficially) these problems are most usefully analysed as
questions of unjust enrichment in which the constructive trust (shorn of mis-
conceived connections with implied intention) may be imposed to prevent
one party from appropriating property which is fairly regarded as the product
of their joint effort. In leading us away from artificial attempts to impute
intent where none was likely to exist, and in speaking plainly and clearly of
the operation that the unjust enrichment principle is to have in this context,
Dickson J. has done much to clear away the sources of the confusion which
have bedevilled the discussion of these problems. Although Dickson J. carried
only a plurality of the Court with respect to the constructive trust analysis,
it is likely that his views will have considerable influence on the lower courts75
and on others who are required to address these problems.
We would emphasize, however, that neither the constructive trust nor
other unjust enrichment remedies seem capable of making more than a limited
contribution to the solution of the financial problems associated with the dis-
solution of marriage. This should occasion no surprise. The common law
tools of contract, tort, property, trust, and, indeed, restitution are rather blunt
instruments with which to analyse a relationship which "in truth, cannot be
analogized to any other relationship known to the law." 70 These difficulties are
compounded, of course, by the profound (and uneven) changes which have
occurred in the social climate in which marital relationships exist. It is no
doubt for these reasons that many feel that the way to reform in these matters
properly rests in our legislatures.7 7 And yet, "the better way", as Laskin J.
said in Murdoch, "is not the only way.' '78 Dickson J. is to be commended for
articulating a basis on which the traditional equitable jurisdiction to impose a
constructive trust can be deployed to effect a partial solution to the injustice
that might otherwise result from the strict application of rules conceived in
another and very different time.
75 See, e.g., Becker v. Pettkus, supra note 70; Ruff v. Strobel, (1978) 9 Alta. R.
378 (Alta. C.A.).
76 Waters, supra note 27, at 381.
77 For recent legislative solutions, see An Act to Amend the Married Women's
Property Act, S.S. 1974-75, c. 29 (which came into force after the trial in Rathwell);
and The Family Law Reform Act 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 2.
78 Supra note 1, at 451 (S.C.R.), 385 (D.L.R.), 380 (W.W.R.).
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